Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

Salt Lake City v. Dimitrios Deslis : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald J. Yengich; Vanessa Ramos-Smith; Yengich, Rich and Xaiz; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant.
Augustus G. Chin; Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Dimitrios Deslis, No. 981269 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1671

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

JTAH
DOCUMENT

•VsJSf

mm

SO

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs,

Case No. 980269-CA
Priority No. 2

DIMITRIOS DESLIS,
Defendant/Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGEMENT AND CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTION
OF JUSTICE, A CLASS "B" MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 11.04.060, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE LEE DEVER, JUDGE PRESIDING

RONALD J. YENGICH #3 580
VANESSA RAMOS-SMITH #7963
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

AUGUSTUS G. CHIN
ASSISTANT SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR
451 South 200 East
Room 125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 9 1998
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J.REQUESTED
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ORAL
ARGUMENT
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of the parties in the
proceedings before the Third Judicial District Court:
JUDGE
The Honorable Lee Dever, Judge Presiding;
PARTIES
Salt Lake City, represented by Kelly R. Sheffield and
Melanie Serasios, Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutors;
Demitrios Deslis, defendant, represented by Edward D.
Flint, Attorney at Law, at trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW

ii

CONTENTS OF ADDENDA

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

.... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

. .

POINT I: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

9

POINT II: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING
TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY OF
A SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT

19 •

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY
FAILING TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS
GUILTY OF A SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT

21

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

25

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT .

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

26
iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONTENTS OF ADDENDA

I.

JUDGMENT1

II.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ORDINANCES & STATUTES

iv
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE
CASES CITED:
Bundy v. Deland,
763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)
1,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
Marzullo
v. State
of Maryland,
561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977) .
Parsons
v. Barnes,
871 P.2d 516 (Utah),
cert, denied,
115 S. Ct. 431 (1994)
People v. Sandoval,
791 P. 2d 1211 (Colo. 1990)
Spevack
v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511 (1967)
State v. Classon,
P.2d
, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Clifford,
502 P.2d 1371 (Or. 1972)
State v. Eldredge,
773 P.2d 29,(Utah),
cert, denied,
493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989)
....
State v. McBride,
940 P. 2d 539 (Utah Ct. 1972)
State v. Mobley,
650 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1982)
State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
State v. Parker
, 690 P. 2d 1353 (Kan. 1984)
State v. Perry,
899 P. 2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
State v. Portillo,
914 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
State v. Russell,
733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987)
22,
State
v. Saunders,
893 P. 2d 584 (Utah Ct. App.)
State v. Walters,
813 P.2d 857 (Idaho 1990)
Stephens
v. State,
734 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1987)

Strickland

v. Washington,

20
15
20
20
12
15
3
17
3
2
12
10
17
3
3
24
3
20
17. •

466 U.S. 668,

104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)
United States
v. Gipson,
553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) . .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES:

v
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
23, 24

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:
Amendment V

3, 8, 15, 22

UTAH CONSTITUTION:
Article I, Section 12

3, 15

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:
§ 76-2-202

3, 15

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
ABA Standards
for Criminal
Justice,
"The Defense Function,"
Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986)
20
Caine, John T., and Wells, Heber, "Declaration of
Grievances and Protests to the President and the People
of the United States," pg. 6
(May 2, 1885)
18, 19
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060
passim

vi
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH #7963
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF

vs.
Case No. 980269-CA

DIMITRIOS DESLIS,
Defendant/Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of
Demitrios Deslis ("Appellant") for Obstruction of Justice, a Class
B

Misdemeanor,

in violation

of Salt

Lake

City

Ordinance §

11.04.060. See Addendum I. This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear
this appeal of a criminal case involving a Class B Misdemeanor,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Was there sufficient evidence presented to convict

Appellant of Obstruction of Justice?
2.

Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise

the issue that the trial court did not make an adequate finding of
guilt

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

with

regard

to

a

specific

subsection of the ordinance?
3.

Did the trial court commit plain error in not making

specific findings as to which section of the ordinance Appellant
was found to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

JL

Standard
1.

of Appellate

Review

"To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, appellant must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the]
evidence contradicts the trial court's verdict." State

v.

McBride,

940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
2»

The ineffectiveness of counsel claim presents a

mixed question of law and fact, such that the trial court's factual

2
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findings deserve some deference on appeal.

However, the legal

conclusions of the trial court are reviewed de novo,

for correction

of error.1
3.

The plain error analysis requires a review of the

trial record as a whole to determine if the claimed errors were
obvious and seriously affected the fairness of the trial.
State

v. Eldredge,

173 P.2d 29, 35 & nn. 7-12 (Utah), cert,

493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State

v. Portillo,

See
denied,

914 P.2d

724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The following ordinance provides the determinative law on
appeal and is reproduced verbatim at Addendum II: Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 11.04.060; Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-202

1

(1953, as

See State v. Classon,
P.2d ,
, 312 Utah Adv. Rep.
26, 30-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State
v. Perry,
899 P.2d 1232,
1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). See also State
v. Saunders,
893 P.2d
584, 591 (Utah Ct. App.) (ineffective presented without prior
evidentiary hearing is question of law), cert, granted,
910 P.2d
425 (Utah 1995).
3
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amended); the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A*

Nature

of the

Case

An Information filed against Appellant on or about March
18,

1998, charged him with Obstruction of Justice, a Class B

Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060.
(R. 4) .

B~

Course

of

Proceedings

Appellant proceeded to trial, without a jury, before the
Honorable Lee Dever, on April 23, 1998 (R. 30). Salt Lake City
Police Officers, Bryan Bailey ("Bailey") and Mike Hatch ("Hatch")
testified on behalf of the City. Tony Ouzounian also testified on
behalf of the City. (Tr. 4, 19, 32). Appellant testified in his
own behalf. (Tr. 35) .

C.

Disposition

in Trial

Court

4
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Appellant was found guilty of Obstruction of Justice by
the Honorable Lee Dever, on April 23, 1998. (R. 36). He was
sentenced that same day to six months in jail, which was suspended,
and a $1,000 fine, of which $800.00 was suspended (R. 36).

D.

Statement

of the

Facts

Bailey testified at trial that he was on duty February 8,
1998, and involved in unrelated arrests at a bar called Papiyons,
located at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Tr. 5). While he was outside
the bar making these arrests, he saw Appellant get into the
passenger's side of a black Porche. (Tr. 5). Bailey observed the
Porche head eastbound on Pierpont Avenue and hit another vehicle
(Tr. 5). This occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. (Tr. 9). Another
officer, Hatch, was also assisting Bailey, and attempted to
approach the accident scene on foot (Tr. 6). Before Hatch was able
to approach the vehicle, it sped off (Tr. 6) .
Bailey had recognized Appellant from prior contacts, and
knew that Appellant lived at American Towers.

(Tr. 12) . Both

officers later went to American Towers and were escorted into the
hallway of Appellant's residence by the security guards (Tr. 7).
5
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The officers arrived at Appellant's residence around 2:54 a.m. (Tr.
11).

Bailey knocked

on the door to Appellant's

residence

and

identified himself. (Tr. 8 ) . Bailey explained to Appellant why he
was there and that he needed to know who was driving the Porche and
where it was located. (Tr. 8) . Appellant indicated that he couldn't
tell the officer who was driving because the driver was a friend.
(Tr. 8 ) . Appellant was then placed under arrest. (Tr. 8 ) . Bailey
testified that Appellant did not request to speak with an attorney
or show him any card which reflected such information.

(Tr. 16,

17) . Prior to transporting Appellant to the police station, the
officers searched his residence to see if anyone was hiding there.
The officers found no one else in the residence. (Tr. 18, 19).
Hatch then testified that he was also on duty outside the
Papiyons bar on February 8, 1998. (Tr. 20) . Hatch testified that he
observed Appellant get into the passenger's side of a black Porche
(Tr. 20) . He later heard a crash and observed the Porche about 4050 feet up the street, which looked as if it had crashed into a
parked van. (Tr. 20). The Porche left the scene as Hatch tried to
approach it. (Tr. 21).

6
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Hatch testified that he and Bailey later went to American
Towers where Appellant lived. They searched for the Porche there,
and located it in the parking lot. (Tr. 22). The vehicle appeared
to have been involved in an accident because it was leaking
transmission fluid. (Tr. 22) . The officers also called for an
impound vehicle prior to speaking with Appellant. (Tr. 25). The
Porche had a dealer license plate on it (Tr. 30) . The officer then
contacted Appellant at his apartment. When Appellant was asked
about the accident, he responded that he wasn't going to talk to
them. (Tr. 23) . Hatch also testified that he never heard Appellant
request a "lawyer" or an "attorney." (Tr. 27). Hatch also stated
that no one else was found in the apartment (Tr. 28).
Tony Ouzounian testified for the City that he owned a
black Porche, which was involved in a hit-and-run accident on
February 8, 1998 (Tr. 32-33) . Mr. Ouzounian further testified that
Appellant was a passenger in his vehicle at that time (Tr. 33).
Appellant's trial attorney moved to dismiss the case at
the close of the City's case for insufficiency of evidence, which
motion was denied. (Tr. 34).

7
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Appellant then testified in his own behalf and indicated
that when the police arrived at his apartment, he informed them
that

he

could

not

answer

any

questions

without

his

attorney

present. (Tr* 37).
The trial court then found Appellant "guilty of the crime
charged" based upon the evidence presented

(Tr. 40). The trial

court further stated that the Fifth Amendment was not an issue,
since the officers both testified that Appellant did not request a
lawyer (Tr. 40). The trial court made no particular finding as to
which subsection of the ordinance he found Appellant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. In addition, the City did not argue for any
particular
ordinance.

finding

of

guilt

under

a

specific

section

of

the

i

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to
convict Appellant of Obstruction of Justice. The conduct by the
Appellant was not intended to be encompassed by the Obstruction of
Justice Ordinance. The act of remaining silent when being asked to

8
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name an offender is not encompassed by the Obstruction of Justice
ordinance. Consequently, the evidence presented at trial did not
constitute a crime by the Appellant.
In

addition,

trial

counsel

was

ineffective

for

not

objecting to the court's finding of guilt without stating which
particular section of the ordinance Appellant was found to have
violated. There are six different methods of obstructing justice
under the ordinance, and no finding was made as to which of those
Appellant violated. Moreover, the trial court committed plain error
by failing to specify which section of the ordinance Appellant was
found to be guilty of violating.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE

The Salt Lake City Ordinance under which Appellant was
charged offers six separate acts of conduct which can constitute
Obstruction of Justice. The ordinance is set forth as follows:

9
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(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent
to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the
commission of a crime, he:
(a)
knowing
an
offense
has
been
committed, conceals it from a magistrate;
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon,
transportation, disguise, or other means for
avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of impending
discovery or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any
physical evidence that might aid in the
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the
person; or
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or
deception anyone from performing an act that
might aid in the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, or conviction of the person.

-

Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060.
The

standard

in

sufficiency

of

evidence

arguments

is

whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person
could

not possibly have reached

doubt. " State

v.

Morgan,

a verdict beyond

a

reasonable

865 P. 2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In the

instant case, there was no evidence presented under any section of
the ordinance which provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant committed the crime charged.

10
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As

stated

above,

there

are

six

sections

in

the

Obstruction of Justice ordinance under which a person can be
convicted. The first section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent/ or delay the discovery/ apprehension,
prosecution/

conviction/

or

punishment

of

another

commission of a crime/ knowing an offense has been
conceals

it

from

a magistrate."

Salt

Lake

City

for

the

committed,

Ordinance

§

11.04.060 (1) (a) . Appellant submits that no evidence was presented
which could support a finding that he concealed anything from a
magistrate. Consequently, a finding of guilt fails as to subsection
(a) of the ordinance.
The second section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution,

conviction,

or

punishment

of

another

for

the

commission of a crime, harbors or conceals the offender." Salt Lake
City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1) (b) . There was no evidence presented
upon which a reasonable person could find that Appellant committed
an offense under this section. Harboring or concealing involves an
affirmative act of hiding, giving shelter or refuge to an offender.

11
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See People

v. Sandoval,

791 P. 2d 1211 (Colo. 1990) (harboring where

defendant hid fugitive under kitchen sink);
P.2d

841

State

v.

Mobley,

650

(N.M. 1982) (defendant convicted of aiding a felon by

hiding felon in her house) . There was no evidence of any act by
Appellant that could be viewed as hiding or giving refuge to an
offender. Consequently, a finding of guilt fails as to subsection
(b) of the ordinance.
The third section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution,
commission

conviction,
of

a

crime,

or

punishment

provides

the

of

another

offender

for
a

the

weapon,

transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or
apprehension," Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(c). Again,
there was no evidence presented at trial which would

indicate

Appellant provided the offender with a weapon, or disguise or any
other affirmative means to avoid discovery or apprehension. There
were no facts presented which would lead a reasonable person to
believe Appellant violated this section of the ordinance beyond a
reasonable doubt. This section requires providing the offender with

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

some type of means of escape, and no evidence was offered in the
trial court which would lead to such a conclusion.2 Consequently,
a finding of guilt fails as to subsection (c) of the ordinance.
The fourth section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution,

conviction,

or

punishment

of

another

for

the

commission of a crime, warns the offender of impending discovery or
apprehension." Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(d). There
was no evidence presented that Appellant ever warned the offender
that

he

may

be

discovered

or

apprehended.

Consequently,

no

reasonable person could find Appellant guilty of Obstruction of
Justice beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus, a finding of guilt
fails as to subsection (d) of the ordinance.
The fifth section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution,

conviction,

or

punishment

of

another

for

the

commission of a crime; conceals, destroys, or alters any physical

2

In this case, it obviously didn't take much police work to
find the driver. He testified for the City that he was the
driver.
13
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evidence

that

might

aid

in

the

discovery,

apprehension,

or

conviction of the person." Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060
(1)(e). Again, no evidence presented to the trial court gave any
indication that Appellant concealed, destroyed, or altered any
physical evidence which might have prevented the discovery of the
offender. The only physical evidence in this case was the Porche.
No evidence was presented that Appellant concealed, altered or
destroyed the Porche. Quite to the contrary, the officers involved
in this case discovered the vehicle involved in the hit and run
prior to having any contact with Appellant. Therefore, these facts
preclude a reasonable person from finding that Appellant was guilty
of violating subsection (e) of the Ordinance, beyond a reasonable
:

doubt.

The sixth section makes it an offense if a person, "with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution,
commission

conviction,

of

a

crime;

or

punishment

obstructs

by

of

force,

another

for

intimidation,

the
or

deception anyone from performing an act that might aid in the
discovery, apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the person."
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Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060 (1)(f). The only supposition
presented which could remotely fall under this section of the
ordinance, was that Appellant refused to provide information as to
the driver of the vehicle. There was no evidence presented that he
used force, intimidation, or deception to prevent the discovery of
the offender. Appellant merely refused to give any information and
remained silent as to the identity of the offender.
Appellant was a potential aider and abetter to a crime,
and consequently, he had the right to remain silent. The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ." U.S. Const., Amend V. The State's are bound, in a
long line of cases, to the strictures of this provision through the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. See Malloy
U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack

v. Klein,

v. Hogan, 378

385 U.S. 511 (1967). Similarly,

the Utah Constitution provides that, "the accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself. . .." Utah Const. Art.
1, Sec. 12. Moreover, the aider and abetter provision of the Utah
Code states that "[e]very person, acting with the mental state
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required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense,

who

intentionally

solicits,
aids

requests,

another

person

commands,
to engage

encourages,
in conduct

or

which

constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953, as amended). When
approached by the officers in this case, Appellant, at least on the
surface, faced the potential liability for a crime as an aider or
abetter. As such, he is afforded the same rights as any other
accused person in a criminal matter, including the right against
self-incrimination.

a

Therefore, when Appellant refused to identify the driver,
he was merely exercising his right against self-incrimination, and
protecting himself from potential accomplice liability resulting
from the hit-and-run accident. By not implicating

the driver,

Appellant was in effect protecting himself by refusing to admit he
was at the scene and present during the accident. Those factors
could easily place him in jeopardy of prosecution for the hit-andrun accident as well. The officers at the time had no knowledge
whether Appellant may have assisted, encouraged, or aided in the

16
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commission of the crime that took place, and consequently, had the
potential of arresting Appellant for the same offense as the
driver. Based upon those factors, Appellant had the right to remain
silent and not to incriminate himself in any criminal conduct by
providing information to the officers as to who was driving the
vehicle, or by providing any information at all to the officers.
This aspect of the case is comparable to Stephens
State,

734 P. 2d 555 (Wyo. 1987) . In Stephens,

v.

the defendant was

charged as an accomplice because he told the police he knew nothing
about a burglary committed by his friend. The court reversed the
conviction stating that there needed to be some affirmative act -a mere denial of knowledge does not amount to a violation of the
law. Id.

The Wyoming court distinguished the facts of that case

from one which would be considered a violation --if the defendant
were to give false information. See also

State

v. Parker

, 690 P. 2d

1353 (Kan. 1984)(obstruction must substantially hinder or increase
the burden on the officer in carrying out official duty -- held
that silence does not substantially increase the burden); State

17
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v.

Clifford,

502 P. 2d 1371 (Or. 1972) (held that one does not become an

accessory merely by failing to disclose a known felon).
It is equally true that one is not required to become an
informant in the United States. Forced informing on friends is not
a requirement of the law in civilized societies. It smacks of the
type of compelled stoolism that has been soundly denounced in this
country as a result of the McCarthy scare tactics during the Red
Scare of the 1950's. In Utah, we have a long history and fear of
compelled informing. As early as 1885, citizens of the Territory of
Utah

complained

about

being

forced

to

snitch

on

neighbors,

relatives and friends in the context of the anti-polygamy crusade
of

the

federal

territorial

officials.

In the

"Declaration

of

Grievances and Protests, " the authors, John T. Caine and Heber
Wells complained, in part:
In Utah, Idaho and Arizona a concerted assault is
made upon the "Mormon" people.
"Spotters" and spies dog their footsteps. Delators
thrust themselves into bedchambers and watch at windows.
Children are questioned upon the streets as to the
marital relations of their parents. Families are dragged
before Commissioners and grand juries; and on pain of
punishment for contempt, are compelled to testify against
their fathers and husbands. Modest women are made to
answer shamefully indecent questions as to the sexual
18
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relations of men and women. Attempts are made to bribe
men to work up cases against their neighbors. Notoriously
disreputable characters are employed to spy into men's
family relations.
Contrary to good law, person accused of crime are
esteemed guilty until the prove themselves innocent. The
burden of proof rests upon the accused instead of upon
the accuser.
Caine, John T., and Wells, Heber, "Declaration of Grievances and
Protests to the President and the People of the United States," pg.
6 (May 2, 1885).
To require someone who is a potential accomplice or just
a witness to talk to the police under threat of prosecution flies
directly in the face of the history of this State and our vigilant
objection to such police state conduct.

POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THE
TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY OF A
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT

To prevail [on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel] , a defendant must show, first, that his counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.

19
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Parsons

v. Barnes,

871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert, denied,

Ct. 431 (1994) (quoting

Bundy v. Deland,

115 S.

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah

1988)) .
Defense counsel failed to object to the trial court's
finding of guilt absent a finding of which particular section of
the ordinance he found Appellant guilty of committing beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

Under

the

Strickland

performance was clearly deficient.3 See State

standard,
v. Walters,

counsel's
813 P. 2d

857, 867 (Idaho 1990) . When an individual is convicted of a crime,
it is the most fundamental of principles that he be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific act or conduct. Appellant
had no way of knowing which section of the law he was found to have
violated, nor did the trial court express to Appellant that he was
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any particular section of

3

See

Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052

(1984). The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for determining
the responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo v. State of
Maryland,
561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA Standard
Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should follow
proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and objections to
protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards
for
Criminal
Justice,
"The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp., 1986) .
20
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the Obstruction of Justice ordinance. Additionally, the prosecution
failed to even articulate which section they believed Appellant was
guilty of violating, and trial counsel failed to even address the
ordinance or its elements in argument.
Trial counsel's performance was deficient by failing to
object

to

the

inadequate

finding

by

the

trial

court,

and

consequently, Appellant suffered prejudice as a result of the trial
court's finding.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE
AN ADEQUATE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF A
SPECIFIC SECTION OF THE ORDINANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT
As noted above, the ordinance under which Appellant was
convicted offers six separate acts of conduct which can constitute
Obstruction

of

Justice.

The

ordinance

is

again

set

forth

follows:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent
to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the
commission of a crime, he:
(a)
knowing
an
offense
has
been
committed, conceals it from a magistrate;
21
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as

(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c) provides the offender a weapon,
transportation, disguise, or other means for
avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of
impending
discovery or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any
physical evidence that might aid in the
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the
person; or
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or
deception anyone from performing an act that
might aid in the discovery, apprehension, T
prosecution, or conviction of the person.
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060. The above subsections outline
different modes of conduct which can each be a violation of the
Obstruction of Justice ordinance. Appellant submits that the issue
argued before the Utah Supreme Court in State
162

v.

Russell,

733 P.2d

(Utah 1987), applies to the instant case. In that case, the

defendant argued that the jury must unanimously agree as to which
of the three theories of mens rea defendant employed to convict him
of second degree murder. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed as it
related to the mens rea of a second-degree murder offense. However,
the

court,

in

dicta,

stated,

"if

the

statute

under

which

the

defendant is convicted actually defines more than one crime which
may

be

committed

in

several

different

ways,

the
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defendant

is

entitled

to jury unanimity

committing." Id.

on which crime he

is guilty of

at 166-67. The Utah Supreme Court relied on the

Fifth Circuit case of United

States

v.

Gipson,

553 F.2d 453 (5th

Cir. 1977), in reaching such a conclusion.
The

Gipson

case

involved

a defendant

charged

with

violation a statute which prohibited six enumerated acts. The jury
instruction given permitted conviction without requiring the jury
to be unanimous on which act the defendant had committed and in
which

incident.

The

Fifth

Circuit

court

reversed

Gipson's

conviction, holding that the defendant was entitled to unanimity on
which actus reus element of the offense subjected the defendant to
guilt in a particular incident. Id. at 457-58. More importantly, as
it relates to the instant case, the Gipson court held that the jury
should have been required to agree upon "just what the defendant
did." Id.

Although Gipson

involved a jury, Appellant submits that

the same principle applies in his case. The trial court is required
to determine just what act Appellant committed which violated the
Obstruction

of

Justice

ordinance. The

ordinance

Appellant was charged has six enumerated

under which

sections which can

constitute a violation of the law. This ordinance is not the kind
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of statute with various distinctions as to mens rea, like the
murder statute dealt with by the Russell

court. It is, however,

akin to the situation presented in Gipson,

and approved, in dicta,

by the Russell

court. The various provisions of the ordinance

actually present distinct conduct which violates the ordinance.
The trial judge did not make any finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt under any specific section. The trial judge
merely found Appellant "guilty of the crime charged." Appellant
argues that such a finding of guilt is directly contrary to the
holding in Gipson

as well as dicta presented in the Russell

case

out of the Utah Supreme Court. Every defendant who is convicted of
a crime is entitled to know what act or conduct was deemed in
violation of law. That was completely lacking from the trier of
fact in this case.
In addition, the trial court's indication that the Fifth
Amendment does not apply in this case is error, based upon
Appellant's argument in Point I, above. Consequently, Appellant's
conviction should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests
this Court reverse his conviction.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above
matter due to the important constitutional questions and rulings
involved.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 1998.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
RONALD J. YENGICH

By
VANESSA M. RAMOS-SMITH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage
prepaid, this

day of September, 1998, to:

Augustus G. Chin
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor
451 South 200 East
Room 125
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

ADDENDUM I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

k

m:

Third District Court, State ofUtah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
;
451 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
;
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/ORDER
Criminal/Traffic
WSTATE

Plaintiff,

Tape Number
lumber

-VS-

Clerk

/.

ARGES .

c*
Time

WW

Judge/Comm

Defendant

rpreter _

^^i

Date

D i ^ i t f e t>^iC
B:

qiWbt&i

Case Number

^ - _

fl

* yj^/tl^k

QMMlQlcb

Plaintiff Counsel

D\?c\idm vukns

&m

Defense Counsel.
Amended
Amended

E COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS:
Jail

Suspended.

5M

If Mt>hJK9

Defendant to Commence
ommen Serving Jail Sentenc^
Fine Amt. $

Susp. $

2GE

Fine Bal $

Fee$

TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $
Payment Schedule: Pay $.
Court Costs

_

per month/1 st Pmt. Due

Last Pmt. nn*-

$

Community Service/WP
Restitution

$

through

:

Pay to:

D Court D Victim •

Show Proof to Court

Attorney Fees $
Probation

W^Good Behavior D AP&P •

ACEC

D Other

Terms of probation:
S^No Further Violations

D

Counseling thru

•

Classes

D Follow Program

•

In/Out Treatment

•

No Alcohol

•

Health Testing _

•

Antibuse

i;

•

Crime Lab Procedure

D Employment

•'

D Proof of.

_

•
•

/ n AA Meetings _ _ _

) Plea in Abeyancq/ Diversion.
) Review

/

I_

/wk

/month

at __

compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
eding special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
is and services) during this proceeding should call Third District
>urt at 238-7391, at least three working
daysbyprior
to theW.
proceeding.
Digitized
the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,District
may contain
errors.Judge
Court

%-2fr"4?

ADDENDUM I I

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE § 11.04.060

(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with
intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery,
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of
another for the commission of a crime, he:
(a) knowing an offense has been
committed, conceals it from a magistrate;
(b) harbors or conceals the offender;
(c ) provides the offender a weapon,
transportation, disguise, or other means for
avoiding discovery or apprehension;
(d) warns the offender of impending
discovery or apprehension;
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any
physical evidence that might aid in the
discovery, apprehension, or conviction of the
person; or
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or
deception anyone from performing an act that
might aid in the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, or conviction of the person.
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 11.04.060.
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CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-104

the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk t h a t the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
n a t u r e and degree t h a t t h e failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care t h a t an
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
1974
76-2-104.

Culpable m e n t a l s t a t e — H i g h e r
states included.

mental

(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for an element of an offense,
that element is also established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly.
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also
established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, t h a t element is also
established if a person acts intentionally.
1998
FART2
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF
ANOTHER
76-2-201. Definitions.
. As used in this part:

prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different
offense or of a different type,or class of offense or is
:f i m m u n e from prosecution.
..-•,•
/•
1973
76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation or association.
A,corporation or association is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an
omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative perfor• mance imposed on corporations or associations by law; or
; (2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized,
solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or
• : , by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his
employment and in behalf of the corporation or association.
'
1973
76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for conduct in name of corporation or association.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an
offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same
extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or
b e h a l f ;<•;

.

.-...',••

r

.

1973

PART 3

, ,..
,

»

(1) "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or
other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or
association.
<
*
.
'
*;
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(a) A partner in a partnership;
(b) An officer of a corporation or association;
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who
,}[ has duties of such responsibility that his conduct
reasonably may be assumed to represent the policy of
the corporation or association.
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by
the laws of this state or any other state to obtain a
certificate of authority, a certificate of incorporation, or
other form of registration to transact business as a
corporation within this state or any other state and shall
include domestic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corporation sole, as such
term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Lack of* an appropriate certificate of authority,
incorporation, or other form of registration shall be no
defense when such organization conducted its business in
a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate existence.
1973

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
> • • : ' ' • • • : }

262

.!• *•'.

1973

76-2-203. Defenses unavailable in prosecution based
on conduct of another.
In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, it is no defense:
(1) That the actor belongs to a class of persons who by
definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing
the offense in an individual capacity^ or . .
(2) That the person for whose conduct the actor is
. criminally responsible has been acquitted, has not been

DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-301., Person under fourteen years old not criminally responsible.
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed
before he reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall
in,no way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the
juvenile courts of this state.
1973
76-2-302. Compulsion.
' '
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have
resisted.
, ^ ;. .
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable
that he will be subjected to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1)
provided.
1973

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not
constitute entrapment.
<
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable, when
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the
person perpetrating the entrapment.
.r w
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to
constitute the offense.
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Amend. I

U N I T E D STATUS UU1NST1/JLUJ.11WI
i
AMENDMENT I

AMENDMENT VIII

[Religious and political freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
[Right to bear arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to.be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI

V

[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. AMENDMENT VH

l;;:

[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.

[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fine
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT EX

,...-;.

j

[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shs
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by tl
people.
AMENDMENT*
[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by tl
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, aire reserved
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENTS

"

[Suits against states - - Restriction of judicial power
The judicial power of the United States shall not be c(
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Sta
AMENDMENTXII
[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and v
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state yt
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the; person vo
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted foi
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all j
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which 1
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the sea
the Government of the United States, directed to the Pr
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—'
person having the greatest number of votes for Presid<
shall be the President,- if such number be a majority of
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person h
such majority, then from the persons having the higl
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted fo:
President, the House of Representatives shall choose imm
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presid
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation f
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose s
consist of a member or members from two-thirdls of the sta
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a ch<
And if the House of Representatives shall not choos
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve v
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case*of
death or other constitutional disability of the Presidentperson having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Presid
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority oi
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person ha
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list,
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole numb<
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shal
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally inelij
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of ^
President of the United States.
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Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
:
the court if released on bail.
*
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial b y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number ofjurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

660

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
4
be seized.
!
"
' 1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of t h e press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896

Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896

Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall a t any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
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Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
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Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
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Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
1896

Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1696

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation.
1896

Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
*
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Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
', :
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
;
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Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
.,_.'. 1896
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1896
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